With the advent of the Arab Spring, the Gulf State monarchies (as well as Jordan) escaped relatively unscathed. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular had moved fast to tamp down on any potential stirrings against its regime, Jordan’s protesters never gained quite enough force to topple their government, and the UAE remained the same sleekly cosmopolitan bastion of commerce that it always had. The question, of course, was begged—why?
The answer lies in two places, but the first and foremost is the rentierism that kept the gulf state monarchies rich and empowered. With the money flowing from the oil profits, these monarchies were able to keep themselves secure and in power from the get-go ensuring that they could establish seriously powerful coercive apparatuses behind the scenes and well-trained and equipped armies to boot, as well as invest (to a degree) in their countries’ infrastructures and well-being of their citizens: enough, in short, to keep the masses happy and content. In non-rentier states wracked by the Arab Spring, Libya and Syria in particular, the government simply did not have the money to ensure that they had the capabilities to ensure the protestors were put down. Syria’s mukhabarat were dependent on citizens informing on one another, of stopping problems before they had even started. Gaddafi had completely gutted his security forces so they could never pose a threat to him—and indeed, some wound up going over to the rebels. Without this rentier power base they had little chance of rapidly building up their security forces or simply having ensured the effectiveness of their own.
The second route is legitimacy. Rather than bread and circuses, a monarchical leader relies on the exceptionalism of kings to ensure their stay in power. This was Jordan’s primary means of ensuring King Abdullah’s holding fast, since it lacked the rentier economy of the Gulf. As seen above, the King is presented as a powerful, intense man, one who will not stoop to any powers that might dare to attack his people and country. The full title of his land is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, emphasizing his lineage that can be traced back to the Prophet. And why would any good citizen want to topple a ruler who has the blood of Muhammad himself flowing in his veins?
A King is far more impressive and imposing a figure than a mere President or Prime Minister. Whether it be the blood of Muhammad with Abdullah or tracing their lineage back to the founder of their nation as with the labyrinthine House of Saud, royalty in the Middle East occupies a peculiarly imposing space within the minds of its citizens. When Jordanian protesters chanted slogans disrespectful of King Abdullah, it was almost unthinkable. In Saudi Arabia or the UAE, to criticize the House of Saud, the President or the Emirs is entirely unheard of. In Oman, where Qaboos remains supreme, it is explicitly forbidden and harshly punishable by law.
When the factors of a strong economic base (typically rentier, but sometimes not as evinced with Jordan) combine with the legitimacy of a Middle Eastern royal, it makes it that much more difficult for the people of that nation to overcome the psychological stumbling blocks of economic complacency and attacking someone who is, simply put, more special than they are. And that is why the monarchies were able to dodge the Arab Spring.
Image Sources
http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/11/saudi_arabias_king_abdullah_to.html
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